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System Change in Austria and Hungary 1918-1919 
Comparison of the Political Aspects of the Austrian 
and Hungarian Crisis Management
From the end of summer 1918 the political elite of Austria and Hungary counted 
with the possibility of war defeat. The successor states inherited the crisis of the 
collapsing Empire. Due to the loss factor crisis management was even more difficult 
for the losers - Austria and Hungary, than for the successor states considered victo-
rious. There are several common features in the crisis management of Austria and 
Hungary. Both of them had to cope with the challenges of war losses and significant 
territory losses. The winners had tacitly acknowledged the territorial demands of the 
successor states before signing the peace treaties. The economies and populations of 
both countries became depleted, which caused strikes and revolutionary phenome-
na. Meanwhile the new coalition governments with social democratic participation 
announced a more democratic and social state in the autumn of 1918. Austrian crisis 
management and consolidation did not induce international intervention in Austrian 
domestic politics. In Hungary, the internal consolidation that began later was due to 
the winners’ direct intervention.
Numerous similarities from the beginning to the end
When comparing the conditions of the state formation and the consolidation of 
Austria and Hungary in 1918 and 1920, it turns out that there were more proces-
sual similarities1 than differences. At the end of the war, both “new states” were 
primarily war-losers with considerable territorial losses, foreign armies stood 
on the periphery of their claimed territories and they had no intact, operational 
military forces against the foreign “invaders”. The elimination from the common 
monarchy and the restart in both states took place without much bloodshed.2 They 
1 SCHNECKER 2007: 110. 
2 On 31 October 1918, István Tisza, former Prime Minister of Hungary (between 1903 and 1905 
as well as 1913 and 1917) was murdered. Tisza was considered a symbol of Hungarian war 
policy, as well as Karl Stürgkh, who was murdered in October 1916, Prime Minister of Austria. 
There were further casualties of demonstrations and violent riots in the late autumn of 1918, 
but these were not directly related to the structural breakdown of the monarchy and have not 
been a high number.
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3 On the different positions of power of the Austrian and Hungarian Social Democrats in: MUR-
BER 2017: 165-181.
4 In Austria, the term State Treaty is used for the treaty signed in St. Germain to make clear that 
the new Austria was not a legal successor to the Habsburg Monarchy, and therefore had not 
signed a peace treaty. In Hungary, the Trianon peace treaty was and is the common term in the 
public debate.
5 Both peace treaties (for Austria Section VI, Article 80, for Hungary Section VII, Article 63) 
made it possible to freely choose citizenship for the population of isolated areas.
6 On the position of the Christian Socialists in the early years more in: BINDER 2008: 241-260.
7 WOHNOUT 2015, 204-205. 
8 Due to the parliamentary elections in January 1920, the National Smallholders’ Party reached 
more than 50% of the seats and formed with the National Conservative party of István Bethlen 
a coalition in which the latter dominated. In 1922, Prime Minister Bethlen forced the merger 
of both parties, and as a result the National Smallholders’ Party gradually moved into the back-
ground and lost its own political profile and voter base.
also shared the fate of overburdened, bled economies and the threat of the war-
weary population, with its shaken social cohesion and a burdensome orientation 
problem. All this was expressed not only in a high degree of mobilisation of the 
population, which was reflected in strikes, demonstrations, violent riots and seces-
sionist tendencies, but also in a looming increasing gap between the (capital) city 
and the countryside. As long as the social-democratic parties were in charge in 
the capitals, the Christian-conservative parties in the countryside extended their 
sphere of influence. In late autumn 1918 both governments faced these critical 
challenges with a social-democratic dominance.3 These governments consisted 
largely of “new” men who had no government responsibility before 1918. In both 
states, starting in 1918, alongside traditional centres of power, new, alternative and 
grassroots democratic power structures existed, such as the workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils, which, however, did not exert much influence on the redevelopment.
The new political leadership in Vienna and Budapest pursued a similar pro-
gramme, which promised to establish a democratic and social state. The chosen 
form of government in both young states was the republic, which in Hungary 
was called the “People’s Republic” in order to further emphasize the proclaimed 
popular sovereignty. Austria had a peace treaty4 since autumn 1919, Hungary since 
summer 1920, which entailed international de jure recognition. However, both 
peace treaties caused a great shock to the local population and to both political 
elites. The area losses as well as the refugees and optants5 from the separated areas 
burdened equally the still depressed economies in the long run. Political power 
gradually shifted from left to right in both states. In Austria, the forced political 
cooperation of the Social Democrats and Christian Socialists6 staggered sharply 
and led to the termination of their government coalition in 1920. This break was 
followed by an internal power shift within the Christian Social Party.7 After a 
sluggish consolidation, a right-wing coalition of national conservatives and the 
National Smallholders’ Party8 ruled Hungary in 1920. This political shift to the 
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right in both states was accompanied by the emergence and consolidation of effec-
tive and persistent stereotypes of the enemy in politics against the Left and Jews.
The meaning of different concepts of national states
In Hungary, there was only one state concept based on the Hungarian “su-
premacy”, which tried to secure dominance of the Hungarian political nation9 
over the other nationalities and ethnic groups under the Hungarian crown in the 
long-term. No serious counter-concept could prevail until 1918. Thus, in late 
autumn 1918, the new government did not have an alternative state concept with 
concessions to nationalities. With considerable modification,10 the new government 
also claimed the entire territory of the former Hungarian kingdom in November 
1918 and did not recognize the territorial claims and assignments of the succes-
sor states. However, international reality and the status of war-loser no longer 
favoured this Hungarian position.
In contrast, the new state leadership in Austria was able to rely on alternative 
nationality concepts in autumn 1918. A concept for this was provided by the Social 
Democrats: Otto Bauer already addressed the nationality problem of the Habsburg 
Empire in 1907 with possible solution approaches of a “cultural autonomy”.11 The 
Social Democratic nationality programme12, adopted in January 1918, already 
contained the right of peoples to self-determination, but still issued the preserva-
tion of a common economic area.13 The German national programme of the late 
19th century by Georg Ritter von Schönerer14 offered an opposite pole to this, on 
which the Greater Germans were able to refer to in late autumn 1918. However, 
both interpretations expected a loss of population and territory in comparison to 
the whole area of the Habsburg monarchy. At the end of the war, Austria’s desire 
of being attached to Germany emerged as the third concept, which contained ele-
ments of the two other ideas.15
Hungary and Austria were defeated nations and the successor states, Czecho-
slovakia, Romania and the South Slavic state had been regarded as victors by the 
9 A well-founded summary about the Hungarian state/nation concept: SZABO 2006: 201-248.
10 Oszkár Jászi, responsible minister for the question of nationality, developed a quickly failed 
concept, which planed a federation according to the Swiss model for the Hungarian territory. 
See: SZARKA 1993:189-201.
11 BAUER 1907.
12 A nationality program of the “Left”, in: AUSTERLITZ 1918:  269-247. 
13 HANISCH 2011: 101.
14 BAUER 2008: 263-264.
15 An overview in: Richard Saage, “Die deutsche Frage. Die Erste Republik im Spannungsfeld 
zwischen österreichischer und deutscher Identität”, in: SAAGE 2008: 65-82. 
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Entente powers. With the tacit approval of the victors, they presented the Austrian 
and Hungarian leaders with a fait accompli. Through their rapid military territo-
rial occupation, the new state borders were already determined, even before the 
peace treaties were concluded. At the determination of the new borders, in most 
cases no democratic principles were decisive, but pure military power.16 Neither 
the new leadership in Vienna nor the one in Budapest did have a serious military 
counterweight. Instead of arms, they had hopes for the benevolence of the Entente 
powers and therefore followed a “pacifist policy”, in contemporary word usage. 
All in all, both defeated nations accepted the emergence of new nation states in 
the area of the common monarchy. Yet, what hurt them most, were the territorial 
assignments of those territories, which they had claimed themselves, for whatever 
reason. Vienna accepted the area losses with the help of alternative state concepts. 
In the case of Carinthia, there were military steps against the South Slavic occu-
pation, but not organised from Vienna. Regional “vigilante groups” stopped the 
further encroachment of southern Slavic troops.17
Despite the advance of foreign armies on the periphery, the respective govern-
ments in Budapest continued to insist on the old concept of “Greater Hungary” 
without being able to enforce this plan militarily. Therefore, their failure was 
already inevitable and ultimately led to their abdication, and also to the proclama-
tion of the Council dictatorship. From the point of view of the victorious states, 
this Hungarian concept of the big state endangered the new international order of 
“collective security” in Central Europe, which favoured the successor states rather 
than the defeated states. The undesirable takeover of power by the Communists 
in Hungary in spring 1919 was another affront and led to a conscious interven-
tion by the victorious powers in Hungary’s process of becoming a state, which in 
turn generated its own momentum. The victorious powers preferred the further 
encroachment of the Czechoslovak, Romanian and South Slavic troops in the 
interior of Hungary18 than sending own troops to Hungary. However, in summer 
1919 the councils rule initiated a brief, but in the end failed defence. Even after 
the collapse of the Council dictatorship no viable counter-concept about Great 
Hungary could prevail, which in turn led to the strong and consensus-building 
revisionism of the interwar period. The new Austria bade farewell to its old em-
pire less painfully, more pragmatically and consensually and arranged itself more 
quickly – even though enforcedly – with its small state than Hungary. Therefore, 
in the eyes of the victors, Austria represented a smaller or rather no threat to the 
16 JUDSON 2017: 563.
17 WEINMANN 2008: 119. - 183.
18 It should be noted, that already on 18 March 1919 in Paris, three days before the proclamation 
of the Soviet Republic, the new state borders of Hungary had been established. Only the course 
of the Austro-Hungarian border was not determined yet.
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new order of Central Europe, and needed less intervention in its successful politi-
cal consolidation.19
Differences between the participants of the restart
On the issue of state sovereignty, there were many other similar processes 
in Austria and Hungary in place, such as the almost seamless adoption of the 
former but functioning state apparatus and the efforts to rapidly develop a state 
monopoly on the use of force and an executive authority with assertiveness. The 
old bureaucracy gave assurances of their loyalty to the new republican rulers in 
Vienna and Budapest. They in turn endeavoured to protect the administrative ap-
paratus from the looming loss of loyalty of the population. However, none of the 
new rulers in Central Europe was able to fully alleviate the dissatisfaction of the 
people mobilized by the war, their urge for change and transformation. Unrest and 
violence spread in the cities and in the countryside. In Vienna and Budapest began 
the quite centrally coordinated reorganisation of the new armed forces in the form 
of vigilante groups already during the demobilisation of the K.u.K. Army. These 
groups were able to guarantee the internal order in the cities for the time being, but 
the establishment of the internal order in the countryside took longer. A striking 
difference in relation to the state sovereignty in Austria and Hungary was shown 
by who was a carrier and an actor in the development of the new statehood.20 
On 21 October 1918, the provisional National Assembly of German Austria was 
constituted in Vienna by the German-speaking members of the Imperial Coun-
cil21 and they decided to form their own Austrian state – “German Austria”. The 
government, convened on October 30 under the Social Democratic leadership of 
Karl Renner, consisted of the parliamentarians of the old Imperial Council. This 
personnel continuity between the old and the new brought along demonstrated 
political competences and personal networks for the new government. Due to the 
universal manhood suffrage of 1907, these politicians, except the German Nation-
alists,22 were representatives of mass parties23 with their considerable followers. 
All parties of the Imperial Council participated in the restart and thus gave their 
commitment to a joint crisis management.
19 Hanns Haas noted that “the new Austria fulfilled the essential criteria of a stable statehood”, in: 
HASS 2014: 379.
20 On minimal criteria of statehood in Austria see: HASS 2014: 371. - 384.
21 The 1911 Legislature Period of the Imperial Council was extended until 19 December 1918 by 
an imperially sanctioned law.
22 The German National Party is to be classified as a classic dignitary party, but was due to the 
Imperial Council elections in 1911 the strongest party of the Imperial Council.
23 Two of the State Secretaries, Ignaz Kaup, State Secretary for Public Health, and Johann 
Loewenfeld-Russ, Secretary of State for Nutrition, were previously imperial officials.
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The strength and importance of the Austrian Social Democracy among the parties 
was shown by their ability to attach conditions on their entry to the government 
on terms such as a schedule of responsibilities.24 The coalition partners were also 
aware of this current strength of the social democracy. They agreed to the crisis 
management, initiated by the “Austro-Marxists”, due to the lack of an own manage-
able crisis programme.25 Carlo Moos said that this pragmatic approach resulted in 
consensus-based solutions from the political legacy of the Habsburg monarchy26, but 
such consensus – he added – called for coexistence and reform-minded “imperial 
types”27 such as Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Franz Dinghofer or Heinrich Lammasch. 
The broad political consensus and the social-democratic power of integration against 
the radical left-wing aspirations, which were not to be underestimated, in spring 
1919, enabled a fairly straightforward political consolidation for German Austria. 
The sense of relief at these temporary successes disguised the already existing and 
quite divergent visions of the right and left mass parties for a time.28
For the separation of powers in the new Austria, Ernst Hanisch noted, that an 
“extreme parliamentary rule” emerged in response to the parliament’s weak posi-
tion in the monarchy.29 The end of the war entailed a high and quite politically led 
mobilisation of the population. The authority of the dynasty as well as the civil 
service and the army passed to the political parties in late autumn.30 The elections 
for the Constituent Assembly, held on the basis of the universal suffrage on 16 
February 1919, confirmed not only this provisional consensus-oriented policy and 
a certain loyalty of the majority of the population to the crisis management, but 
also met the democratic expectations of the victorious powers. Nevertheless, an 
invitation to the peace negotiations took until 2 May 1919, which was also due to 
the priority of the negotiations on Germany’s future. Apart from that, the initially 
successful self-assertion of the Hungarian Council dictatorship and the necessary 
“containment policy” of the Entente was decisive for this rather late invitation. 
Austria’s process of state formation between 1918 and 1920 was characterised by 
a predominantly participatory political culture. The broad consensus of these mass 
parties supported the crisis management, which was also affirmed and accepted 
by the population in the national parliamentary elections in spring 1919 with a 
universal, equal and secret suffrage.
24 The tripartite conditions of the Social Democrats are in the protocol. ÖStA AdR NPA StRP 
Cardboard 1st Conference of the State Council on 30.10.1918.
25 HANISCH 2011: 147
26 MOSS 2016: 77. 
27 MOSS 2016: 80.
28 HANISCH 1994: 266. 
29 HANISCH 1994: 266.
30 BERGER 2008: 57.
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In contrast to Austria, there was a lack of broad political consensus in Hungary 
as well as of the political participation of the population until the very end. On 24 
October 1918, a Hungarian National Council was constituted, which formed the 
core of the new government within a week. This National Council was composed 
of a parliamentary opposition party,31 whose head was the liberal-democratic 
Count Mihály Károlyi and two non-parliamentary opposition parties, the radi-
cal democrats, which was a party of urban-critical intellectuals, and the Social 
Democrats. Due to the census suffrage no mass parties were formed in Hungary, 
so the members of the National Council – except the Social Democrats – could 
not rely on any party network. In the eyes of broad sections of the population, 
Károlyi was the personification of the hope of a restart and a better future due to 
his democratically-social programme, which was announced for months. Under 
the pressure of the riots in Budapest, Emperor Charles appointed Károlyi prime 
minister on 31 October 1918. Although Charles relieved this government from 
their oath to the monarch a day later, the Károlyi government provided the royal 
appointment with a constitutional but merely symbolic legitimacy.
In late autumn 1918, Károlyi was, also in the eyes of the moderate national 
conservatives and liberal conservatives of the old power elite, a quite acceptable 
figurehead, who seemed suitable for representing Hungarian interests.32 Neverthe-
less, there was no far-reaching personnel continuity between the old and the new 
in the new government. The old power elite refused their participation in the crisis 
management and thus the division of responsibilities. The often overwhelming 
central and decisive role of Prime Minister Károlyi blocked the possibility for 
a course correction and minimized the political adaptability to the increasingly 
burdensome conditions.
Hungary’s restart was therefore not a party-political agreement. Károlyi was 
the political focal point. He dominated the affairs of state not only because of his 
accumulation of various postions,33 but much more because of the weakness of the 
political parties. Károlyi’s party was a minor dignitary party (Honoratiorenpartei) 
31 Despite the prohibited universal suffrage in Hungary, the Hungarian Parliament met throughout 
the war. However, due to the prohibited universal suffrage, it consisted only of dignitary parties.
32 Even Ex-Prime Minister István Tisza argued in the parliament on 22 October 1918, that 
Károlyi had the necessary relational capital for Hungary to the West, to the Entente powers. 
In: Képviselőházi Napló, 22. October 1918. Count Pál Teleki and Count István Bethlen, both 
prime ministers of the inter-war period did not distance themselves from Károlyi’s policy at 
that moment.
33 From 31 October 1918 Károlyi was the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
from 12 December 1918 he also took over the representation of the Ministry of Defence and 
between 11 January and 21 March 1919 he served as President of Hungary. It also happened in 
the case of Karl Renner who, in addition to the Chancellorship, also took over other ministe-
rial departments, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Interior, Education and 
Foreign Affairs.
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with narrow social basis. The Hungarian Social Democrats, like their Austrian 
counterparts, had the densest and most comprehensive party network and a viable 
programme for the future, which enabled them to participate in the redevelop-
ment.34 But their sphere of influence was more modest than that of the Austrian 
Party members. In consequence of their extra-parliamentary opposition, the party 
leadership did not possess the competences and experiences of policy-making, 
which the like-minded Austrians already had in autumn 1918.
The Austrian provisional legislation was recruited from the old Imperial Council, 
had three equal presidents and was constituted on the basis of the new elections in 
February 1919. By contrast, the democratic legitimacy of the Hungarian legisla-
tion was far less pronounced. The National Council, convened on 24 October, an 
exclusive centre of power without democratic legitimacy, with its claim to legislative 
and executive powers, was composed, legally not entirely clear, of representatives 
of the administration, parties and various political and administrative bodies. On 
behalf of the National Council, the Károlyi government provided itself, in addition 
to the executive, also with legislative power on the basis of the Public Law of 22 
November 1918.35
In Hungary, as in Austria, a law was passed on universal, equal and secret suf-
frage. But the constituent National Council elections were postponed until April 
1919. According to official justification, elections without the participation of 
the occupied territories would have equalled de jure recognition of the territorial 
losses of Great Hungary. The proclamation of the Soviet Republic finally prevented 
the elections announced for April. This allowed neither the democratic opinion 
formation of the population on the crisis management nor the constitution of a 
constituent National Council.36 The phenomena of the executive and legislative 
in the Hungarian state formation process reflected a predominantly paternalistic 
political culture based on a subject mentality.
Divergent international impulses in the name of “collective security”37
Only in the last year of the war did the new concept of a Central European 
order without the Habsburgs emerge.38 But on how this Central Europe of small 
34 The government programme in late 1918 was largely based on the Social Democrats’ programme 
announced on 8 October.
35 Az 1910. évi június hó 21-ére hirdetett országgyűlés képviselőházának irományai, LXIV.m 1918: 412. 
36 The first parliamentary elections took place in January 1920 in those electoral districts where no 
foreign armies were stationed. The elections resulted in a right-wing conservative parliamentary 
majority and right-wing coalition government with the participation of a Christian-Social and 
a Smallholders’ Party. The Social Democrats kept away from these National Council elections 
in protest against the “white terror”.
37 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, “Kollektive Sicherheit, Demokratie und Entspannungspolitik. Der 
historische Ort des Völkerbunds in der Geschichte der Moderne”, in: DOERING-MANTEUFFEL 
2014: 305-316. 
111
Ibolya Murber - System Change in Austria and Hungary 1918-1919...
states should look, there were different, competing concepts in 1918, one of the 
“East” and one of the “West”. Under the right of self-determination of the peoples, 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin proclaimed a self-imposed, but rather theoretical, above 
all territorial sovereignty. Woodrow Wilson, American President, understood the 
self-government of a democratic regime under the same buzzword.39 In the last 
year of the war, both “ideological offensives”40 reached the Habsburg Empire, 
thus accelerating its process of disintegration.41 Both interpretations found a 
strong repercussion in the Central European political and public discourse, with 
territorial independence and sovereignty being the undisputed key objective for 
the nations. In the political discourse emerged an additional link between demands 
for national independence and more democracy.42
In 1918, “democracy” became “suddenly” popular in Central Europe and was 
regarded as an alternative to the authoritarian “hated old”, which could be equated 
with the Habsburg Monarchy and its weaknesses as well as with the war and its 
suffering. “The future seemed to belong to democracy.”43 The new political actors 
hoped that the proclamation of a new democratic order would also lead to greater 
sympathy by the victors and thus to better peace conditions. On the contrary, there 
was a lack of an already established democratic-political culture. Apart from social 
democracy and some radical intelligentsia, there was no democratic tradition behind 
the new political slogan, let alone an anchoring in broad sections of the population. 
This ultimately led to the early failure of this democratic experiment everywhere 
in Central Europe – except in Czechoslovakia. This export of democracy at the 
end of the war took place in a very troubled economic situation, so it was unable 
to bridge the socio-economic problems that had already arisen before the war as a 
result of the transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society.
On 16 October 1918, Emperor Charles offered in his manifesto the official 
consent to national self-organisation in the form of national councils, but within 
a federal framework.44 In doing so, he legalised the already established national 
councils in Zagreb and Krakow and gave the legitimising impetus for their crea-
tion in Prague, Vienna and Budapest.45
38 A detailed and well-founded account of the role of the Habsburg Monarchy in the war can be 
found in: RAUCHENSTEINER 2013. 
39 More about the years 1918-1923 in: FISCH 2010: 144-189.
40 RAUCHENSTEINER 2008: 21-41.  
RAUCHENSTEINER 2008: 38. 
41 On the catalytic role of the Russian revolutions in: MORITZ 2017: 48.
42 KRÜGER 1993: 101.
43 HANISH 1994: 267. 
44 RUMPLER 1966
45 The imperial manifesto only referred to the Austrian half of the empire. Opinions and literature 
differ about whether this is due to the emperor’s self-decision or to the express request of the 
Hungarian leadership. 
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International recognition through a peace treaty presupposed not only the criteria 
of the de facto statehood (national territory, state population and state authority)46 
but also democratic leadership, a government recognised and accepted by the ma-
jority of the population,47 which had been regarded as a grant for internal stability 
and international order. According to these intentions of the democratic victori-
ous states, democratic legalization of the new state power served to stabilize and 
protect the new international state system that they had established. If the new de 
facto states endangered the new concepts of order of the victorious states, the lat-
ter acted with different but usually modest methods. The “imperial viewpoint” of 
the Entente enabled the decision-makers in Paris to hand over territories of a state, 
endangering the new and desired order of Central Europe, to a preferred country.48
---
Austria and Hungary were the losers of the war and were perceived as respon-
sible for the war, which was tantamount to foreign policy isolation. The basic 
guidelines of Austria’s and Hungary’s foreign policy were the same. The focus 
was on the so-called “pacifist” policy, which was based on the hope of the US 
President Woodrow Wilson and his programme. Neither Vienna nor Budapest was 
able to counteract the occupations militarily. For the time being, they expected 
these secessions of territory to be temporary and that the “just” peace treaty would 
cancel at least part of them. Therefore, an early peace agreement was desired. 
Compared to Hungary, the new Austria had a foreign policy that hardly aroused 
any intervention of the victorious powers, except the connection efforts to Ger-
many. Until the Council dictatorship, Prime Minister Károlyi made the foreign 
policy of Hungary, which in contrast led to an increasing influence on Hungary’s 
domestic affairs by the Entente powers.
Thanks to Bauer’s tactical and diplomatic skills,49 Austria was able to exploit 
its own problematic food supply and thus exert a moderate, but certainly exist-
ing influence on foreign policy conditions.50 At the end of the war, the question 
of supply bottlenecks became the focus of political action in Vienna and these 
experiences strengthened the belief in the inability of small Austria to survive 
and the necessity of a connection to Germany. In late autumn 1918, the Austrian 
46 According to Georg Jellinek’s definition, a state is constituted by the following three elements: 
national territory, state population and state authority, in: JELLINEK  1914: 394-434.
47 This democratic legalization of the new state power expected by the victorious powers should 
be confirmed by means of universal suffrage and parliamentary elections.
48 MURBER 2018: 198. 
49 MOOS 2016: 44-45.
50 According to Ernst Hanisch, the follow-up policy was Bauer’s first big mistake as a top politi-
cian. See: HANISCH 2008: 214-215.
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government already made several appeals to the international community to save 
its urban population from starvation. Negotiations in Switzerland and in Vienna 
began between representatives of Austria and the victorious powers regarding pos-
sible aid.51 As a result, international aid was given to Austria. Non-governmental 
organisations, the Red Cross, the Quakers and the Swedish Mission distributed 
relief supplies in Austria. Herbert Hoover, the US Food Commissioner for Europe, 
gave a loan of 48 million dollars for the Renner government for the immediate 
purchase of food.52
This international aid could be interpreted as a success of the new Austrian 
foreign policy, which strengthened the internal legitimacy of the new regime. 
Furthermore, the negotiations and the received aid were regarded as a de facto 
recognition of the existence of the new Austrian state. In addition, personal contacts 
and communication with representatives of the Entente powers about the country’s 
problems brought positive output from the negotiations. Foreign Minister Bauer 
skilfully juggled with the Austrian dependence resulting from the threatening sup-
ply bottleneck. By arguing that Austria needed the help of the Entente, he rejected 
a Bolshevik experiment with Hungary53 and its own population. The “weapon” 
of supply problems was usable in many ways. The food capacity of the claimed 
area for Vienna’s food supply also played a role among the Austrian arguments 
for connecting Western Hungary54 to Austria.
In spring 1919, another, but unexpected means of exerting pressure was added 
to the inventory of Austrian political arguments for action. The proclamation of the 
Hungarian Council dictatorship on 21 March 1919 frightened the decision-makers 
in Paris, even though they already had knowledge of left-wing radical activities in 
Budapest.55 The victorious powers’ containment policy towards Austria was based 
on concessions, such as the removal of the economic blockade and the invitation 
to peace negotiations56 in Paris, but also on threats with the suspension of Allied 
food supplies in the event of a council experiment. 
51 LOEWENFELD-RUSS 1986: 231-282.
52 BERGER 2008: 60.
53 ÖStA AdR NPA Nachlass Bauer, Karton 234. Umschlag IX. d, N. 393-408. In Hungarian SZÍNAI 
1994: 449-470. 
54 Today it is the province of Burgenland.
55 Colonel Sir Thomas Cunningham, head of the British Military Commission in Vienna, acted 
strongly against left-wing extremist tendencies in Austria and feared the spread of Bolshevism 
from Hungary to Vienna, about which he wrote numerous reports.
56 The Austrian representatives, as well as the German and later the Hungarian colleagues, were 
isolated and could not actively participate in the negotiations. They received the conditions in 
writing, to which they also had to reply in writing, only exchanges of notes took place. Among 
the representatives of the defeated, only the chairman of the Hungarian delegation, Count Albert 
Apponyi, was allowed to make a plea for the Hungarian arguments, which found little or no 
repercussion for the improvements of the Hungarian peace conditions.
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Hungarian foreign policy operated under less favourable conditions than 
Austrian foreign policy. The lack of international recognition weighed more on 
Hungary, although it pursued the same pro-Western, Entente-friendly policy like 
Austria. The only foreign policy result was the Military Convention of 13 No-
vember 1918 in Belgrade, presented by the Károlyi government. In this ceasefire 
agreement, the southern and eastern demarcation lines of Hungary were defined 
by Entente military representatives and this therefore meant a de facto recognition 
of Hungary. However, these were ignored by further occupations of neighbouring 
countries, especially after the proclamation of the Council dictatorship. The lack 
of foreign policy successes and the complex domestic political and economic 
crisis made it difficult to consolidate Károlyi’s weak coalition government and 
encouraged the belief in the need for radical attempts as a solution. 
The Hungarian Communists, sent and supported by Moscow, acted particu-
larly purposefully to undermine the overtaxed state power. The increasingly 
weakening Hungarian statehood with shrinking internal and external sovereignty 
aroused more and more attention and concern among the decision-makers in 
Paris. The establishment of the Council dictatorship in Hungary developed an 
international momentum against Hungary under the leadership of the victorious 
powers. The foreign policy suspension of Hungary’s weak statehood and the 
lack of sovereignty were also reflected in the fact that the Bolshevik dictator-
ship in Hungary had been established with foreign policy support from Soviet 
Russia. But the country also needed the active intervention of the West to induce 
consolidation after the Council dictatorship at the beginning of August 1919. 
After the communist dictatorship, the victorious powers used a policy of car-
rot and stick on Hungary: the economic blockade was lifted and Hungary was 
invited to peace negotiations, but very hard and painful peace conditions were 
presented and imposed on them. In 1920, the international community could 
show more “sympathy and compassion” to a starving small state like Austria, 
which resisted the hated communism, than to the small state of Hungary, which 
insisted on “Greater Hungary”, sank into chaos and communism and subse-
quently into revisionism.
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Promjena sistema u Austriji i Mađarskoj 1918. – 1919. 
Usporedba političkih aspekata austrijske i mađarske krize uprave
Austro-Ugarska Monarhija izgubila je Prvi svjetski rat. Od kraja ljeta 1918. 
politička elita obiju zemalja računala je na mogućnost ratnog poraza. Događanja 
u Rusiji 1917. godine imala su simboličko značenje; osnažila su unutarnju krizu 
dualne monarhije. Unatoč tomu, nije unutarnja kriza izazvala raspad ovog višena-
cionalnog carstva, nego vojni poraz i promjene u međunarodnom odnosu snaga.
Zemlje nasljednice naslijedile su krizu raspadajućeg carstva. Zbog poraza, kriza 
upravljanja bila je još teža za gubitnike – Austriju i Mađarsku, nego za zemlje 
nasljednice koje su smatrane pobjednicama. Nekoliko je zajedničkih obilježja krize 
upravljanja u Austriji i Mađarskoj. Obje su se zemlje suočavale s izazovima koje 
je donio ratni poraz i znatni teritorijalni gubitci. Pobjednici su prešutno priznali 
teritorijalne zahtjeve zemalja nasljednica i prije potpisivanja mirovnih sporazuma. 
Gospodarstva i stanovništvo obiju zemalja bili su iscrpljeni, što je uzrokovalo 
štrajkove i revolucionarne pojave. U međuvremenu, nova koalicijska vlada sa 
socijaldemokratskom većinom najavila je u jesen 1918. demokratskiju i socijal-
niju državu. Austrijska kriza uprave i konsolidacija nisu izazvale međunarodnu 
intervenciju u austrijskuunutarnju politiku. U Mađarskoj, konsolidacija koja je 
započela krajem ljeta 1919. bila je izravna intervencija pobjednika.
Ključne riječi: Habsburška Monarhija, Austrija, Ugarska, demokracija.
Keywords: Habsburg Empire, Austria, Hungary, democracy, crisis management.
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